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McRAE 8 D E L A N D 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
THE WHITLEY MANSION 
132 SOUTH 6 0 0 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102 
T E L E P H O N E (SOD 3 6 A - I 3 3 3 
L O N ! F D E L A N D 
COURT OF APPEALS 
2 0 9 EAST IOO NORTH 
VERNAL. UTAH 84078 
T E L E P H O N E (80 ! ) 7 S 9 - I 6 6 6 
ROBERT M MCRAE 
HARRY H S O U V A L L 
December 3, 1990 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: S t a t e of Utah v, Roxanne Cornwal l 
Case Ko.tfj0jfa-Clf. 
LETTER IN LIEU OF BRIEF 
Please be advised that the Defendant/Appellee, Roxanne 
Cornwall, is unable to afford the appeal in the above-entitled 
matter; therefore, I request that this Court refer to the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Defendant's Memoran-
dum that was filed with the Third District Court 
Sincerely, 
Loni DeLand 
LFD/dm 
cc: Kent Morgan 
Dan R. Larsen 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ROXANNE K. CORNWALL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No, 900302-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court dismissing the charges of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (to wit: cocaine), a third 
degree felony, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(to wit: marijuana), a class "B" misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did Judge Rigtrup err in concluding as a matter of law 
that the Administrative Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court does not constitutionally permit the visual and hand search 
of a purse for weapons or other dangerous objects when the purse 
is presented for admittance to the court building and an x-ray 
examination indicates a large metal object is contained inside 
the purse? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress will not be distributed on 
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing 
that trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual 
findings, the appellate court applies a "correction of error" 
standard of review. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IVi 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
places to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on November 28, 1988, with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (to wit: cocaine), 
a third degree felony, and unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance (to wit: marijuana), a class "B" misdemeanor, both in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1988) (R. 6-7). 
After an evidentiary hearing held on June 21, 1989, Judge Rigtrup 
entered an order on November 21, 1989, suppressing the evidence 
(R. 78-79). The State's Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order was denied by this Court on March 2, 1990. 
State v. Cornwall, Case No. 890704-CA. Judge Rigtrup entered a 
final order of dismissal on April 20, 1990 (R. 97-98). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are generally undisputed. On 
November 21, 1988, defendant, Roxanne K. Cornwall, entered the 
Third Judicial District Court building, also known as the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, in Salt Lake County. (R. 80-91) 
(See Exhibit "A"; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.) 
Defendant was carrying a large levi bag which was submitted for 
an x-ray examination to determine if weapons were contained 
2 
inside. jEd. The x-ray examination revealed a solid black 
screen which indicated a substantial amount of metal was 
The trial court's findings were substantially based upon the 
facts recited in defendant's suppression memorandum to which 
facts the State stipulated below. (R. 65). 
2 
Posted in plain view on the entry doors was Administrative 
Order 87-1, signed by Presiding Judge Scott Daniels, which read 
in pertinent part: 
All persons entering the Third District Court 
Building and/or the Fifth Circuit Court 
Building (Third District Court area) are 
subject to search for and confiscation of 
firearms, knives, other dangerous or 
potential weapons, and/or instruments, 
chemicals, or objects that may cause danger 
or injury to others, or that may disrupt the 
ordinary conduct of business within said 
court buildings. The Salt Lake County 
Sheriff, authorized deputies, court bailiffs, 
or other duly appointed peace officers may 
conduct said searches and confiscation by the 
authority granted herein. Preliminary 
searches shall be conducted by metal 
detection, x-ray screening devices, or other 
like instruments, however, normal hand 
frisking shall also be authorized. 
(R. 51-52, 80-81) (See Exhibit MB"; Administrative Order). 
contained in the levi bag (R. 82). Bailiff Lynn Huffman 
explained to defendant that the bag would have to be searched 
because metal was indicated (Id.). 
Huffman placed the bag on her lap, looked inside, and 
discovered two smaller purses approximately 12 inches long, 8 
•a 
inches high, and 10 inches wide (R. 83) (T. 19) . Unable to 
determine the source of the metal, Huffman opened one of the 
purses and removed a clear plastic baggie, the first thing on the 
top of the purse, which plainly revealed its contents: a 
kleenex, false fingernails, and a small piece of paper folded 
4 
into a bindle (R. 83) (T. 20). Based upon her experience and 
training, Huffman recognized the paper bindle as a packaging 
method for controlled substances (R. 84). Huffman handed the 
plastic baggie to Bailiff Jack Weiss and asked him to check the 
bindle (Ld.). Weiss opened the bindle and discovered a white 
powdery substance suspected to be cocaine. Subsequently, 
defendant was detained, a full-blown search of her purse was 
conducted, and a pipe containing marijuana fragments was seized 
(Id.). 
(MT.M) refers to the suppression hearing transcript.) 
4 
In his findings of fact, Judge Rigtrup noted that the evidence 
was unclear as to what point in the search Huffman removed the 
plastic baggie and noticed the paper bindle (R. 83). It is also 
unclear as to when defendant objected to the search and attempted 
to terminate it by grabbing for the baggie saying, MI didn't 
remember that was in there" (R. 83) (T. 22). However, Judge 
Rigtrup did find that the evidence was clear that Huffman wholly 
removed the baggie from the purse and examined it before the 
bindle was noticed and that defendant objected to the search 
prior to the bindle being opened (R. 83). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1 mi 11 h (I' R i q I i mi 11 ("'"i if t M'I in i I'M in 1 mill i mi |i (hat fin? r o c i i n e 
La ri<j 11" wd . i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d pi j isuanl In a h a n d - s e a r c h ml 
d e f e n d a n t ' H pun-n "The s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s e s t a b l i s h t h a t B a i l i f f 
Huffman wa1 R*?aii 1 m i m 111 Inn iwijai| iniii*. <u nllini <i laiinini na* iil-niisfds when 
she removed a c l e a t p l a s t n b a g g i e f i onu deieiidanlL s p u i s n win i i h 
p l a i n l y r e v e a l e d a p a p e r b i n d l e Huffman 's h a n d - s e a r c h of 
de fendan t f MI i i < (in wnri [ H IHI  I i I , I i II a \ t i II m m II ( 1 1 1 1 > 1 1 a 1 1 1 t 1 1 II !i\ 
adiin n J s trat i ve search excepLiuii Lu the waiianl lequjrement The 
cocaine bmdle was observed in "plain view" during the weapons 
Ream li nnnl II Im II 11 ml I i > wan II nqn II \\ s e i / m l inn I i ipei ini l l whe i i llliii I (iiiiiin 
had a reasonable beliel, based upon hei training, thai the bindle 
contained cocaine. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COCAINE BINDLE WAS LAWFULLY SEIZED IN 
PLAIN VIEW DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE WEAPONS 
SEARCH, 
uiiii appnn 1 , I tin hi ilt iilnn . mil d i s p u t e Judge Ihngt n i,i| i'" s 
f i n d i n g s oi t a i l , but only h u l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s , S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
t h e S t a t e cha l l engers Judge R i q t r u p ' s c o n c l u s i o n s ( I ) t h a t Huffman 
i I in 1 1 i in 1 1 1 II in f 1 1 I  mi II in i II mi mi II I.I 1 1 1 in 1 1 1 1 j n 1 1 1 1 mi in in I II 1 1 i mi II i II II in t , » II " n" ii i : a i„ in in s 1" III 1 1 mi 1 i J II i ?
 r 
i| •' I t ha t oven i t Huffman had a lawful van taqn p o i n t , t;he b i n d l e 
was not a d e a r l y s e i z a b l e i tem oi e v i d e n c e , and ( "\) tha t t h e 
openiiiiii|i II! Il In- h i lid I i ill M>| I «at iiiiii in iiiipnj in i s iiJiiln ijeiipi^ i iJi I hsv'1 ni illlii 
f o r e v i d e n c e (If HI"1 (if! | | *e Exhibi t . "A1; F i n d i n g s , C o n c l u s i o n s ) . 
Whi l e a t i i d l c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s under ly ing an 
s u p p r e s s i o n r u l i n g are a f l o i d e d subsLant ia.1 d e f e r e n c e , a t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s l e y a,I c o n c l u s i o n s aire a f for de d no d e f e r e n c e by an 
appellate court and are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985). 
A. THE HAND-SEARCH 
The threshold question is whether Huffman could legally 
hand-search defendant's purse for weapons. While Utah appellate 
courts have not yet addressed this issue, numerous other 
jurisdictions have upheld as constitutional administrative 
searches for weapons at sensitive public buildings." Admittedly, 
most case law on administrative searches has involve*! the use of 
magnetometers and x-ray devices at airport terminals. 
However, a body of case law exists directly concerning 
courthouse searches for weapons. See, e.g., McMorris v. Alioto, 
567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 
(6th Cir. 1972); Davis v. United States, 532 A.2d 656 (D.C. App. 
1987); Commonwealth v. Harris, 383 Mass. 655, 421 N.E.2d 447 
(1981) . 
In one of the earliest courthouse search cases, the 
court found a brief detention to check briefcases at a courthouse 
entrance akin to a border search, thus not requiring a warrant. 
Barrett v. Kunzig# 331 F.Supp. 266, 272-73 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), 
cert, denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1982). Later, the Ninth Circuit 
5 
Because defendant's motion to supress and the trial court's 
ruling do not engage in separate state constitutional analysis, 
this case should be reviewed for correctness under the federal 
constitution only. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 
1240 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 
830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974); Shapiro v. State, 390 So.2d 344 
(Fla. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981); McSweeney v. 
State, 183 Ga. App.l, 358 S.E.2d 465 (1987). 
f d u r t nf Appeal F in fiTi o p i n i o n w r i t ton by t linn C i r c u i t I M v 
ll in mi I I in 11 i in , Ih'iiiieij'j , iJil ill in/fill I! In. ii Ji pui l Bi 'dirh i a l J una Ie In i 
c o u r t h o u s e s e a r c h e s p e r m i s s i b l e aft an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e Bean " 
reqii i r i nn i 'war ran t , McMorris v . Al ini 11, hf > V 2d i t H *i' I bee 
a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . D a v i s , 4R? F,?d H'M, HiiilHl-h | <" 11 I i i i 11973) 
(airport search case). 
More recent ,1 y I he Dist r let c f Col umbia Court ot 
Appeals al se adopted t inn adnunistrat i, ve search rationale and 
explained there are "three factors which must be balanced in, the 
a (1 ill I iri i s t, r a 1 i VH fiei'iT'cli cont^xl i ( I |n I ho p u M ic necessity i in 
requiring a searcl'i; (7) the efticacy of the search procedure; and 
(3) the degree of Intrusiveness of the search, " Davis v. United 
States , VI.1 A '"Ml .rut fit) I), In Ua^ vi. s,''' ii I icensed p'hysn ia 
tc enter a publi' building iv pay fui an examination to practice 
HI I lie locality, Dayjs, SB? A 2d at bSH, i'«i sn)ii at the 
• • i l l h i m »' i l l 1 In I HI i II i II 11 ii | wd i in "i 1 1 In 01 llh ii|>
 l( pin ie,s ( null hi ietdfjF.es 
would be cheeked beio r e entering. JUi. Upon entry, a security 
officer Informed Da\ it thai Jiib backpack m u d be seanJied iui 
W c i i p i ) 11 S t i t I I i J i ' I n m < i i I  lul l I » I.I I I i i W v d t • 11 li i i 1  111 i I I I I i i i \ ft i i S 
Other courts have applied similar rationale to courthouse 
searches. See Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 
1987); Rhode Island Defense Attorneys Ass rn v. Dodd, 463 A.2d 
1370, 1372 (R.I- 1983); Commonwealth v. Harris, 383 Mass. 655, 
421 N.E.2d 447, 448 (1981). See also United States v. Davis 482 
F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973) (airport search); State v 
Salitr 613 P.2d 245, 250-53 (Alaska 1980) (airport search); 
People v. Hyde, 12 Cal.3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal.Rptr. 358, 
363 (1974) (airport search); Jensen v. City ef Pontiac, 1 1 3 
Mich.App. * V ^ n Vf w.2d 61 9, 622 (] 982) (Rtadi um search) 
8 
Judge Rigtrup recited and applied the Davis criteria in his 
Conclusions of Law (R. 88) . Therefore, a detailed discussion of 
the Davis case is warranted. 
bag to the officer who opened the bag and uncovered a gun case 
containing a loaded revolver. Id. The gun was immediately 
seized. Id. 
Balancing the three criteria set forth above, the Davis 
court found that the hand-search of the bag was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1^. at 
662. It determined that a defendant impliedly consents to the 
search of his or her bag upon entering a public building posted 
with warnings of an administrative search upon entrance. JEd. at 
660. While the Davis court noted that the search may have been 
less intrusive, it stated that the search did not rise to the 
C) 
level of a Terry" frisk requiring reasonable suspicion, but 
instead was "the very type of limited warrantless search that is 
recognized as an exception to the requirement of a warrant." Id. 
at 661. 
The Davis court commented on the legitimate concern 
that an administrative search is potentially overbroad and may 
uncover items that are not the object of the search. Id. at 662. 
The court stated that in the absence of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, "an administrative search should not be a 
criminal search designed to specifically uncover incriminating 
evidence." ^d. However, the court stated that if a reasonable 
and limited administrative search uncovers criminal evidence, the 
search should not be invalidated. Id. 
Interestingly, the Davis court noted that it would be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for courts to require 
^ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969). 
that, only the most sophisticated electronic equipment be utilized 
for administrative searches, Id. at 8b,.1 , The court stated that 
even I I IK mi in i M u I mil III egu i pinem! ii h m<K|m-'t oniet,, e r s inna |/ "I eai I! t < -in 
o v e r b r o a d s e a r c h , i d , dill lid I I n e v i t a b l y
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dppiel"i€ins 11 HI ill lliiii iulr.il in r Id The piian LiCdJ coi'ibHqutMn eh 
ol d i s c o v e r i n g c o n t r a b a n d o t h e i t han bombs or weapons '"" doc?s no t 
a l t e r t h e e s s e n t i a l l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e n a t u r e of t h e s c r e e n i n g 
piuceh,':' „ . . 01 i' (-fiiiiJ* i I he Keai * heii IILIIII :0111s I i I. ut. iona ' 
661-62 (quriting 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise or: the 
Fourth .^endi^rit § 10. f) ( r) a 1 i "") ( 1 9R 7 ) ) , 
I I'm rJii I i'm i t In,11, I; , 111 •: D a V I S l ULiJ I i'6'i, i t, €;d t.hv L«,hi I, 1, m u i il \ 
one of t h e s e c u r i t y o f f i c e r s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t d u r i n g an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e weapon s e a r c h , t hey a l s o "check t o sec? if t h e r e XD 
a11) n a r c o i i cs oi any 11111111 t 11a I L ,". i I I LMJII I i h(11 tin Law if o r b i d s 
yuu from h a v i n g ' Id, al M»l n U The coui L s t a l e d t h a t while? 
a weapons s e a r c h ima | become m'p! I if i ml i us i vt , t h e s e c u r i t y 
olJ i t e r s t a t e d Midi I he parL11 u l a i p u r p o s e el t h e s e a r c h was t o 
uncove r weapons , Id I n d e e d , t h e s e a j r h uni ove red t h e o b j e c t 
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a n d t i i n l i ) I I I I J < i i i l m i l I I P I I Ii 1111111 in I Dupee!" >• i t y ( in* weep 
s e a r c h e s all the? cou r tho i i be \\\ BB H'M || II1 11 4H) He alBn k 
n o t i c e ol I  he e f f i c a c y ol t h e magne tomete r and x - r a y p r o c e d u r e s 
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Davis test was nol. met wheie the search of defendant's pursue 
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following the x-ray examination was conducted without probable 
cause, reasonable suspicion, reasonable procedural efficacy, or 
authority under the Administrative Order (Id.. ). On that basis, 
he ruled that the search was overly intrusive because it did not 
comport with Terry stop guidelines (R. 89-90). 
Judge Rigtrup's ruling is incorrect for three reasons. 
First, the Administrative Order specifically provides that while 
preliminary searches shall be conducted by metal detection, x-ray 
screening devices or other like instruments, "normal hand 
frisking shall also be authorized" (R. 52) (See Exhibit "B"; 
Administrative Order). The order also states that "purses shall 
be subject to x-ray examination and/or search. . . ."(Id.) 
(emphasis added), Thus, hand-searches of purses for weapons are 
specifically permitted under the Administrative Order. 
Secondr Terry stop guidelines are inapplicable to the 
limited nature of administrative searches. In fact, the Davis 
case relied upon by Judge Rigtrup explicitly states that the 
hand-search of the physician's backpack did not rise to the level 
of a Terry frisk requiring reasonable suspicion. Davis, 532 A.2d 
at 661. Instead, the Davis court said that a limited 
administrative search for weapons is by itself a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
However, administrative searches are not reasonable in 
all settings just because they have been approved for courthouses 
and airports. Courts have foreclosed administrative searches in 
a variety of other situations. See Ringe v. Romero, 624 F.Supp. 
417, 420-23 (W.D. La. 1985) (bar patrons); Collier v. Miller, 414 
F.Supp. 1357, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (patrons in university 
pavilion); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 952 (Haw. 1981) (rock 
concert patrons). But see Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 
1341 (2d Cir. 1987) (magnetometer search of Ku Klux Klan rally 
1 1
 Id. 
Tl ix iu , hann- s e a r c h e s roiidm iian ex r i u s i v e i y t o d i s c o v e r 
weapons a r e a r e a s o n a b J i- iiiull M I I I I M I mil JJJ <a e d u i e • S e v e r a l 
c o u r t s havcj found thtit a dai k mass on an x - r a y s c r e e n w a r r a n t s 
fu i fhPi ' s t a in h tnh i rli t h e s u s p e c t has iimpjl ] Pd 1, y c o n s e n t e d t o by 
pJd» j ng t in u b j n I l u r x - r a y i n s p e c t i i n I In i t ed S t a t e s v . 
H e r z b r u n , 723 F, I'd 773, 7 lb ( i l l Ii I 'I ( 1 484 ) ,• U n i t e d S t a t e s v . 
Wehi I i , I I |' ?ill 4 nil 4 ill11 I I | 'i Mi I 'M I m l , d e n i e d , 4 "N* INS 
94? | 1 rll» > ! United States v. Deangelo, 1)84 "h 2d 4 6, 4H (-Ith i.'.r, 
1 9 7 8 ) , ce11 . denied , 440 U.S. 9 i B> ( 1 "I 7 y | ; Un] ted States v, Scott, 
1111
 " ' " I I ' ' ' ' " " I ' " MM lhl " l> " I H ^ S w e e n y v • S t a l e IIIII I 
b a i 11 I I ("ill ' I •11 I 11 J " 4 l i I ' U N | in K h i v . S t a t e
 r <11111 W 2 d 
4RIJ, 4B2-H \ (Fla, L)JF1 Ct , Apr ), review denied, 408 So, 2d 1095 
I II 1 i II ' I I I  | 11 i i n n II i in II I n II i II I II | I n I f in I f h a I II t i p x «" in a y s i r m 
machine indicated Clay s shoulder baq umtaiiied an unidentifiable 
dark object created sufficient suspicion to justify a complete 
Cont. '' Con I. attendees upheld), cert:, denied, 48:5 U S 
1034 (1988); Jeffers v. Heavrin, 701 F.Supp. 1316, 1323 (W.E , Ky. 
1988) (administrative search of race track patrons uphe] d); 
People v. Whisnant, 103 Mich. App. 772, 303 N.W.2d 887, 8911 
(1981 ) (suspicj onless searches of pri son vi si tors upheld). 
However, administrative searches are not reasonable in 
all settings just because they have been approved for courthouses 
and airports. Courts have foreclosed administrative searches in 
a variety of other situations. See R inge v. Romero, 624 F.Supp. 
417, 420-23 (W.D. La. 1985) (bar patrons); Collier v. Miller, 414 
F.Supp. 1357, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (patrons in university 
pavilion); Nakamoto" w, Fasi , 635 P.2d 946, 952 (Haw. 1981) (i 'ock 
concert patrons). But see Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 
1341 (2d Cir. 1987) (magnetometer search of Ku Klux Klan rally 
attendees upheld), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988); Jeffers v. 
Heavrin, 701 F.Supp. 1316, 1323 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (administrative 
search of race track patrons upheld); People v. Whisnant, 103 
Mich. App. 772, 303 N.W.2d 887, 891 (1981) (suspicionless 
searches of prison visitors , m ^ ^ v 
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physical search of the luggage until the object was positively 
identified as harmless." United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889, 892 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 917 (1981). 
The Ninth Circuit has held that a magnetometer is "no 
more than a gratuitous means by the government to rc*duce the 
number of persons searched." United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 
929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). Likewise, the same 
circuit noted, "The x-ray is used only to determine whether a 
further physical search is indicated." United States v. Henry, 
615 F.2d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1980). 
The fact that defendant might not have wanted Huffman 
to search her bags is of no consequence. The weight of authority 
supports the proposition that once a bag has been presented for 
x-ray search, the person may not withdraw consent for a physical 
search. See United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 
(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 230-31 
(4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 972, 988 (1981); United 
States v. Wehrli, 637 F.2d at 410. See also McSweeney v. State, 
183 Ga. App. 1, 358 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1987); Morad v. Superior 
Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 436, 118 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522-23 (1975). 
But see United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 808 (2d Cir. 
1974) (refusal to find implied consent). 
Admittedly, a search which goes beyond looking for 
dangerous objects may be overly intrusive and therefore improper. 
See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 
(9th Cir. 1989). In $124,570 U.S Currency, a security guard, in 
hopes of securing a reward from police authorities, asked 
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As t h e Second C'IXXTJ i t no t ed " f T ] I I" he s e a r c h i s 
p r o p e r , I t i s of no moment t h a t t h e o b j e c t found was not wlial t h e 
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consented t o a search of hei purse when she placed 1 c * -
r ay machine conveyer belt. Upon viewimj a blau*. sureen w m u i 
indicated large metal objects, Huffman was authorized to conduct 
a hand-search of the contents of the purse to dispel the 
possibility that a weapon may be concealed inside. Huffman 
removed a black purse approximately 12 inches long, B inches 
high, and 10 inches thick (T. 20). Because the purse contained 
many objects, it was difficult to search the purse by simply 
looking into it or feeling through it (T. 20). Accordingly, 
Huffman began to remove objects from the purse. Id.. The first 
item on the top of the purse was removed and observed to be a 
clear plastic baggie containing false fingernails, kleenex, and a 
paper bindle (T. T. 20-21) (R. 83) (See Exhibit HA"; Findings, 
Conclusions). 
Nothing in the evidence or Judge Rigtrup's conclusions 
indicates that Huffman's initial purpose for the hand-search was 
anything other than a proper weapons search. Up to the point of 
viewing the contents of the clear plastic baggie, Haffman had not 
exceeded the scope of a reasonable hand-search for weapons. 
Additionally, Judge Rigtrup's findings do not dispute that the 
search was intended for weapons, at least until Huffman focused 
on the visible paper bindle. Accordingly, Judge Rigtrup erred as 
a matter of law in concluding that Huffman did not have a lawful 
vantage point to view the paper bindle. 
B. PLAIN VIEW 
Granting that Huffman had a lawful vantage point, the 
next inquiry is whether the bindle was properly seized under the 
plain view doctrine. This Court has explained that the "plain 
view" exception requires: (1) lawful presence of the officer; (2) 
evidence in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly 
incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citing State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), a plurality of the United 
States Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the phrase 
"evidence which is clearly incriminating" to mean that there must 
be "probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." Jd. at 741-42. This standard "merely requires that 
the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct . . 
. . A practical, non-technical probability that incriminating 
evidence is involved is all that is required." Icl. at 742 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 367 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). This 
language was explicitly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 390 (1986). In Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987), the Supreme Court finally resolved the 
issue of what level of suspicion is required in order to invoke 
the plain view doctrine, holding that probable cause is required. 
In a case directly on point, the California Supreme 
Court held that a bindle, in and of itself, can create probable 
cause for arrest on charges of cocaine possession. People v. 
Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 587 P.2d 706, 710, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 
(1978) (a folded paper could be seized and opened because the 
officer had previously observed cocaine or heroin to be 
transported in similar paper bindles). See also Boyd v. State, 
621 S.W.2d 616 (Tex- Cr. App. 1981) (police officer's knowledge 
that heroin is commonly packaged in tin foil bindles was 
sufficient to establish probable cause upon observation of 
bindles). Cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742-43 (officer, based 
on his experience and training that balloons tied in the manner 
of the one possessed by the defendant frequently contained 
narcotics, had probable cause to believe the defendant's balloon 
contained an illicit substance). 
Applying plain view standards to the present case, all 
three prongs were* met: (1) Huffman was lawfully present 
conducting an administrative weapons search; (2) the bindle was 
plainly observed through the clear plastic baggie; and (3) 
Huffman had probable cause to believe that the bindle contained 
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contraband. In fact, Judge Rigtrup in his findings of fact 
recited Huffman's testimony that she suspected the bindle 
contained cocaine based upon her police training in narcotics. 
(R. 84) (T. 21-23). Huffman testified that she was one hundred 
percent certain that the bindle contained cocaine (T. 23). 
Judge Rigtrup incorrectly applied a factual standard of proof 
to the legal determination of probable cause. Specifically, 
Judge Rigtrup applied a "clear and convincing" standard of proof 
to the legal determination whether the "plain view" exception was 
met (R. 87). Admittedly, the facts underlying a "plain view" 
assertion must be established by a particular standard of proof -
i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14 (1974) ("controlling burden of 
proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"),. However, the 
burden of proof is inapplicable to the ultimate legal question of 
whether the seizure in this case was lawful under the plain view 
doctrine. 
_1 £_ 
Noticeably, Judge Rigtrup did not apply the "clearly 
incriminating" test as outlined by this Court in Holmes, but 
apparently required actual knowledge or a search warrant based on 
probable cause. See Holmes, 774 P.2d at 150-12. As quoted 
above, only probable cause to believe that certain items may be 
contraband is required, not a showing that the belief is correct. 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. Once probable cause exists, the 
officer may seize the evidence without the "needless 
inconvenience" of obtaining a warrant. Jd. at 739. Huffman's 
recognition of the bindle as a packaging technique for cocaine 
created a "'practical, non-technical' probability that 
incriminating evidence" was present. Jji. at 742 (quoting 
Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 176). Nothing more was 
required to seize the evidence. Common sense dictates that 
police should not have to close their eyes to criminal evidence 
properly within their view. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 464-68 (1971). 
C. SEARCH OF BINDLE 
The next inquiry is whether Huffman could open the 
bindle once it had been legally seized as evidence of a crime. 
In this regard, Judge Rigtrup concluded that the warrantless 
search of the bindle's contents was impermissible absent any 
exception to the warrant requirement. (R. 88) (See Exhibit "A"; 
Findings, Conclusions). However, case law concludes otherwise. 
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the United 
States Supreme Court suggested that "not all containers and 
packages found by police during the course of a search will 
deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment," I_d. at 765 
n.13. For example, some containers, e.g., a kit of burglary 
tools or a gun case, "by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectations of privacy because their contents can be 
inferred from their outward appearance." Id. 
The California Supreme Court utilized this rationale in 
allowing a police officer to seize and open paper bindles where 
the officer had special knowledge that such bindles are used to 
transport cocaine or heroin. People v. Lilienthal, 587 P.2d at 
709-10. In Lilienthal, the police officer had lawfully stopped 
the defendant for a traffic violation, observed a distinctively 
folded piece of paper fall from the defendant's wallet while the 
defendant was searching for his driver's license, seized the 
folded paper, and opened it. Id. The officer's suspicion that 
the neatly folded squared piece of paper contained contraband was 
based on the officer's experience in making numerous arrests 
wherein cocaine or heroin had been transported in paper bindles 
similar to that dropped by the defendant. j[d. at 709. The court 
explained that " [reasonable grounds for believing a package 
contains contraband may be adequately afforded by the package's 
shape design, and the manner in which it is carried." Iji. at 710 
(citing People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 1109, 
103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972)). 
Likewise, Bailiff Huffman in the present case 
recognized the unique characteristics of the paper bindle as a 
packaging technique for cocaine (T. 21) (R. 84), (See Exhibit 
"A"; Findings, Conclusions.) Because the contents of the bindle 
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could be reasonably inferred by its outward appearance, defendant 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bindle's 
contents. Therefore, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated by Huffman's opening of the bindle without a 
13 
warrant. * 
D. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Because Judge Rigtrup concluded that the initial 
seizure wcis illegal, he also concluded that the subsequent, full-
blown search of defendant's purse was tainted and therefore the 
marijuana pipe was not admissible as a search incident to arrest. 
Again, Judge Rigtrup incorrectly applied the law. 
Obviously, if the initial seizure of the cocaine bindle 
was not illegal, the subsequent seizure of the marijuana pipe was 
permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. In State v. 
Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 
45 (Utah 1989), this Court reiterated the principle that a 
"search is not invalid despite the fact that it precedes a formal 
arrest so long as the arrest and search are substantially 
contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the arrest exists 
independent of the evidence seized in the search." Id., at 1111-
12. See also State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986). 
The record and findings are sufficient in the present 
case to conclude that the subsequent search was substantially 
contemporaneous with the initial seizure of the cocaine, the 
13 
The outward appearance exception to the warrant 
requirement is narrow and does not generally apply to personal 
luggage items which by their very purpose "is to serve as a 
repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them." 
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764. 
resulting detention of defendant, and the eventual arrest of 
defendant for possession of cocaine. Probable cause to arrest 
defendant existed independently on the basis that the bindle 
contained a white powdery substance suspected to be cocaine. 
Huffman testified that she believed probable cause was present 
and that defendant was not free to leave (T. 37) (T, 84). 
Defendant was removed to a different location where the search 
occurred, and a detective was summoned to place her under arrest 
(R. 84). During the subsequent search, a marijuana pipe and 
suspected marijuana residue were seized from defendant's purse. 
See State v. Houser, 669 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1983) (search of 
backpack in possession of arrested person was prop€*r incident to 
arrest). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) (2d ed. 
1987). Thus, the subsequent full-blown search of defendant's 
purse was substantially contemporaneous with defendant's arrest 
which was supported by probable cause. Therefore, the evidence 
seized in that search was admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse Judge Rigtrup's Order of Dismissal 
and remand this case for trial. 
DATED this -^V day of September, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 1 1989 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROXANNE K. CORNWALL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891900095 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 21, 1988, Defendant, Roxanne K. 
Cornwall, entered the Metropolitan Hall of Justice (courthouse) 
via the main (400 South) entry doors, carrying a large denim 
purse. 
2. Upon entry, Defendant submitted her purse for x-ray 
examination and her person to passage through the magnetometer, 
which devices were being operated by Salt Lake County Sherifffs 
Office/Third District Court bailiffs, for administrative search 
pursuant to the said court's Administrative Order 87-1, under 
date of January 23, 1987, signed by the presiding judge Scott 
Daniels. 
3. The said order, which was posted in plain view on 
the entry doors, reads in pertinent part: 
All persons entering the Third District Court 
Building and/or the Fifth Circuit Court 
Building (Third District Court area) are 
subject to search for and confiscation of 
firearms, knives, other dangerous or poten-
tial weapons, and/or instruments, chemicals, 
or objects that may cause danger or injury to 
others, or that may disrupt the ordinary 
conduct of business within said court build-
ings. The Salt Lake County Sheriff, au-
thorized deputies, court bailiffs, or other 
duly appointed peace officers may conduct 
said searches and confiscation by the author-
ity granted herein. Preliminary searches 
shall be conducted by metal detection, x-ray 
screening devices, or other like instruments, 
however, normal hand frisking shall also be 
authorized. 
Administrative Order 87-1, which was in effect on the 
date in question, is completely and accurately set forth in the 
attached copy thereof and should be and is hereby incorporated by 
reference and made a part of the said Findings of Fact. 
4. The issuance of said Order was in direct response 
to the previous and well known incident occurring in said court-
house, wherein a firearm was smuggled into prisoner/defendant 
Ronnie Lee Gardner who thereafter shot and killed an attorney and 
wounded a bailiff before being himself wounded and captured. 
5. The stated purpose for implementation of the said 
search procedures was the recognized need to protect members of 
the public, attorneys, jurors, witnesses, litigants and court 
personnel against violent and injurious actions or incidents 
within the courthouse. 
6. Administrative Order 87-1 expressly includes within 
the scope of prohibited items or substances chemicals which 
present a danger of being used to inflict violence or injury; 
however, it neither expressly nor impliedly includes controlled 
substances or drugs possessed for uses other than violence. 
7. By entering the courthouse, Defendant gave her 
implied consent to the x-ray examination of her purse and 
magnetometer scan of her person and to other such reasonably 
intrusive searches of her person and property within the scope of 
the said order (No. 87-1) insofar as the search did not exceed 
the proscriptions of federal and state constitutional law per the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14, respectively. 
8. Defendant passed through the magnetometer without 
incident; however, the x-ray image of Defendant's purse, as 
viewed by Bailiff Huffman, was an indiscernable dark mass. 
9. The said x-ray image did not provide any basis for 
suspicion that any weapon or other item or substance proscribed 
by Order 87-1 was contained in the purse; however, the said 
image, consistent with most women's purses, indicated the pres-
ence of metallic objects. 
10. Bailiff Huffman then informed Defendant that she 
was going to search the Defendant's purse by hand. 
11. Huffman neither asked for nor was given Defendant's 
express consent to conduct any search inside Defendant's purse; 
however, Huffman immediately searched the purse of Defendant 
which revealed two smaller purses. 
12. Huffman's live testimony before this court, on June 
26, 1989, the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony and 
the stipulated Statement of Facts in Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss (which stipulated facts Plaintiff's 
responsive Memorandum acknowledges), create certain inconsis-
tencies and lack of clarity as to what next occurred according to 
Bailiff Huffman. 
13. Accordingly, although she (Huffman) opened and 
searched each of the smaller purses, it is unclear as to what 
point in the search she removed a clear plastic baggie containing 
the fingernails, kleenex and small paper envelope (or bindle) 
from one purse; or what point in the search she noticed the said 
envelope; or, what point Defendant objected to the physical 
search and tried to terminate it. 
14. It is clear that Defendant's express consent was 
not given; that Defendant objected to the search at some point 
prior to the opening of the envelope; that the plastic baggie was 
wholly removed by Huffman from the purse and visually examined 
before the envelope was noticed; that the baggie obviously 
contained no metallic objects or items proscribed by the order 
due to their propensity for use in violent or injurious action; 
that the search was not at any time limited to a "frisk" or 
manual squeezing but instead was an intentional, full, visual and 
manual search of the purses' contents by Huffman, as per her 
admitted intent, express testimony and by her actions. 
15. It was not known by Huffman whether the envelope 
contained any substance, illegal or otherwise; upon finding the 
envelope Huffman suspected it contained cocaine based upon 
similar appearing envelopes observed in her training; Huffman 
handed the unopened envelope to Bailiff Weiss who opened it, 
whereupon the contents were revealed as being a white powder 
consistent in appearance with cocaine. 
16. Huffman thereafter continued her search of Defen-
dant's purses, at first at the security checkpoint and later 
after removing the purses and the Defendant to another area in 
the building. During said search, although the location and 
timing is unclear, Huffman opened a small opaque plastic contain-
er which revealed a smoking pipe with residue of suspected 
marijuana therein, and she opened an aspirin tin, finding small 
white tablets which she suspected were "speed." 
17. In the early stages of the search Defendant was 
free to leave, however, she was not free to leave later on. At 
what point the status became a detention is unclear; however, 
Huffman did not place Defendant under arrest. 
18. After all the suspected drugs and paraphernalia 
were seized, Defendant was arrested by a detective summoned for 
that purpose and the instant charges were thereafter brought. 
19. Laboratory analysis of the suspected substances 
proved that the envelope did, in factf contain a small amount of 
cocaine and that the residue in the pipe was indeed, marijuana; 
however, the tablets in the aspirin tin were not illegal drugs as 
suspected. 
20. The evidence and testimony before the court to be 
sufficient for the Plaintiff to sustain its burden as to the 
reasonableness of the instant warrantless, non-custodial search, 
must persuade the court that the facts and circumstances in this 
case meet any test for an exception to the warrant requirement. 
21. The Plaintiff correctly admits that Defendant did 
not consent to any search beyond the scope of the administrative 
order. 
22. In this case, Huffman admits that in this and other 
cases, whenever searching for weapons she is also consciously 
conducting a search for drugs or other contraband collateral 
thereto. 
23. Huffman had no prior information about Defendant to 
heighten her suspicions; she observed nothing on the x-ray screen 
of a suspicious or unusual nature; she admits that the "majority" 
of women's purses have a similar x-ray image; she had no in-
dication from Defendant or her property of any improper or 
illegal activity or proscribed possessions; she had no 
articulable reason to conduct a complete internal examination of 
Defendant's purse(s), particularly without utilizing less intru-
sive means such as individually x-raying the smaller purses or 
"frisking" by touch the exteriors of the smaller purses to feel 
for weapons. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Third District Court Administrative Order 87-1 is a 
lawful mandate necessitated by the public interest in preventing 
violence or injury within the courts buildings occasioned by the 
introduction of weapons, bombs, injurious items or other sub-
stances capable of causing physical injury or like danger, 
2. The administrative order does not extend implied 
consent to a general search or a search for drugs, contraband, 
evidence of a crime nor any other items or substances not by 
their nature tools of violence, weapons, bombs, or other items or 
substances from which those within the courthouse are in need of 
protection against injury. 
3. Persons attempting to enter the courthouse security 
entrances impliedly consent to searches of their persons and 
things pursuant to the proscriptions and limits of Order 87-1. 
4. Order 87-1, cannot and does not, on it's face nor 
as intended to be applied, exceed the proscriptions set forth in 
the United States Constitution, Amendment Four, and the Constitu-
tion of Utah, Article I, Section 14. 
5. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under 
both constitutional provisions absent an exception thereto 
recognized by the court. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment Four. 
(Article I, Section 14, identical in substance and proscription.) 
6. When, as in this case, a defendant has filed a 
Motion to Suppress a non-custodial, warrantless search, with 
sufficient factual bases, it is the government's burden to prove, 
with clear and convincing evidence, that there exists a lawful 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
7. The instant search was, without dispute, conducted 
without the actual consent of Defendant, waiving her rights under 
the state or federal constitutions regarding search and seizure. 
8. Plaintiff's evidence is neither sufficiently clear 
nor sufficiently convincing to meet its burden to prove the 
evidence seized herein falls under the "plain view" exception. 
9. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
its officer had a lawful vantage point upon observing an envelope 
she suspected contained cocaine; that the observation itself, 
even if lawfully vantaged, at best created an issue of probable 
cause to seek a search warrant to enter the envelope, but not a 
clearly seizable item of evidence; and that the actual observa-
tion of the contraband substance (rather than its container) was 
obtained only after an impermissible general search for evidence 
of a crime without any exception to the warrant rule nor any 
exigencies recognized under the law. 
10. The subsequent search of Defendant's purse(s) which 
produced suspected marijuana and/or other contraband was per-
formed solely for the purpose of searching for evidence of a 
crimef particularly drugs, and not for weapons. 
11. The said subsequent search and seizure was clearly 
outside the scope of the administrative authority under Order 
87-1; was not done pursuant to any lawful non-custodial, war-
rantless search exception; was nevertheless tainted as derived 
from the prior unlawful search which revealed the suspected 
cocaine; and cannot be considered a search incident to arrest 
since the arrest of Defendant occurred after said seizure and 
Defendant's pre-arrest detention status is unclear from the 
evidence. 
12. The final exception to the warrant requirement upon 
which Plaintiff must rely is the most recently recognized excep-
tion, administrative searches. 
13. Plaintiff's Memorandum correctly cites the case law 
and factual circumstances required to find an exception under 
Davis v. United States, 532 A.2d 656 (D.C. App. 1987), and other 
administrative search cases; i.e.: 
a. Public necessity; 
b. Efficacy of search procedures; 
c. Degree of intrusiveness; 
14. The court takes judicial notice of the public 
necessity graphically demonstrated by the above referenced 
Gardner incident which was the catalyst for the administrative 
order herein and by the results of the order's implementation; 
i.e., scores of seized weapons of all description. 
The court also takes notice of the efficacy of that part 
of the procedure which utilizes the magnetometer and x-ray 
devices and purports to limit further searches per reasonable 
suspicion, Terry-stop guidelines. 
15. The search and seizure cannot be excepted from the 
warrant requirement on the basis of the administrative search 
doctrine where the search and seizure exceed the scope of the 
administrative order (87-1), constitutional proscriptions and the 
third prong of the test under Davis to determine the acceptable 
degree of intrusiveness. 
16. The search of Defendant's purse following the x-ray 
examination thereof was done without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, or pursuant to reasonable procedural efficacy or 
authority under the Administrative Order. 
17. The said search and seizures are objectionable 
under the narrowed focus/degree of intrusiveness principles of 
Davis. 
18. The evidence seized from Defendant herein which 
forms the basis for both counts in the instant information were 
seized as the fruits of a search that was overbroad, overly 
intrusive, unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and Article If Section 14 of the Consti-
tution of Utah. 
19. The Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden with 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the adminis-
trative search exception. 
20. Whereas the courts finding that the burden regard-
ing the plain view exception cannot be met due to the inconsis-
tency and lack of clarity in the testimony of Plaintiff's witness 
and the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the Plaintiff, 
the court specifically finds the search of Defendant's purse(s) 
by Huffman exceeded the scope of Administrative Order 87-1 and to 
find otherwise would grant unfettered discretion and general 
search powers to the court security personnel to search for any 
evidence of any crime irrespective of the public necessity for 
prevention of violence which is the intended focus of the securi-
ty searches and would thereby render the order itself to be 
beyond constitutional limits. 
21. The evidence seized from Defendant and upon which 
she stands charged before this Court should be suppressed for the 
foregoing reasons. 
22. Any Finding of Fact which should have been enu-
merated in the Conclusions of Law or any such Conclusion which 
should have been made a Finding herein should be incorporated 
with the other where appropriate. 
DATED this 2j"c!ay of November, ]989 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of November, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Kent Morgan, Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
ADDENDUM B 
3ISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D1BTKJCT 
_ fun SALT KM;I- covin ;» STATE OF UTAH 
A D M f ri i ,;.,n' "-iM v- r O R D E R 
RE: COURT SECURITY 
ADMIN LSTR/1 
Ho, 87 -1 
Cour t by Admin 
previously * 
.ation^. 
i Apr i l 
ren^rea 
WHEREAS i • *-u~ J u d g e s of t h e T h i r d P: s t r i c t 
Co in i 01 -he n e e d mproved s e c u r i t y fni; Mn1 p r o t e c t i o n of 
members of *- p u b l i c * IVY* , 1 «i'i "i"B
 r w i t n e s s e s , l i t i a a n t s 
a c o u r t p e r s r l o l e n t a c t i o n s i n c i d e n t s occ r1 i r / ; 
v c o u r t s b u i l d i n g s e n v i r o n s . * I 
WHEREAS, t h e Judges ; ; 
t i v e Orde 1 d a t e d / 
f>r i m p i a m e n t a i < . >* "ou / - S e c u r i t 
and s u b m i t t e d t h e Sal I 
NOW, *] p u r s u a n t 
i> D i s t r . c i r c u i t C o u r t s o f 
h e r e b y 
ORDEREI FOLLOWS: 
persons entering the Third Dif 
and/or the Fifth Circuit |l" IM i • • • 11 • 11, u - • (Third District Court 
area) are w•«\'«1 «<;»/*• io search for and confiscation of ~: 
knives, other dangerous or potential weapons, mi instruments, 
chemicals, or objects that may I-MUSM danger oi injury " others, 
tiding 
- * * 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, (I ) PAGE TVJO 
or that may disrupt the ordinary conduct uf Ims i ner.* within 
said court Sheriff, authorized 
deri!tlt?f:i court bailiffs< other duly appointed peace officers 
may conduct gaid searches and confiscation iiy II i« < ui. hurity 
granted searches shall be conducted I 
metal detection# x-ray screening devices, • : other like instruments, 
however, normal hand frisking shall also 
All hi i i*f r«,'*',j- inui.-r* (,;,
 l luggage, packages and . ; irscs 
shall |jn;» subject ray examination anJ/or sear'*- * ~. -~ 
Salt Lake County r-< '" ' - authorizes riopnMi „ - i 
or other <]M I y af"1!" '•>! f icers for detection and conf; -1* i -:. 
of firearms, knives, other dangerous weapons, and/or instruments, 
chemicals objects that may cauhr- ilnnnrr '>'" If lwi\ to i-theri;, 
oi thft il I «.i ti|it I lie ouilnrtry conduct business within 
said court buildings. 
Dated this J 3 day of Jmin.11 y 'h< '. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
Pursuant to Rule '11.1(b) of the Rules of Practice of the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, as Presiding 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, I hereby certify 
that I have conferred;with the other Judges of the Third Judicial 
District Court in regard to this Administrative Order, and that 
a majority of said Judges concur in the adoption of the above-stated 
Rule, 
SCOTT DANIELS 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
